Managing the social amplification of risk: a simulation of interacting actors by Busby, Jeremy & Onggo, Stephan
Managing the social ampliﬁcation of risk: a
simulation of interacting actors
JS Busby
  and S Onggo
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
A central problem in managing risk is dealing with social processes that either exaggerate or understate
it. A longstanding approach to understanding such processes has been the social ampliﬁcation of risk
framework. But this implies that some true level of risk becomes distorted in social actors’ perceptions.
Many risk events are characterised by such uncertainties, disagreements and changes in scientiﬁc
knowledge that it becomes unreasonable to speak of a true level of risk. The most we can often say in
such cases is that different groups believe each other to be either amplifying or attenuating a risk. This
inherent subjectivity raises the question as to whether risk managers can expect any particular kinds of
outcome to emerge. This question is the basis for a case study of zoonotic disease outbreaks using
systems dynamics as a modelling medium. The model shows that processes suggested in the social
ampliﬁcation of risk framework produce polarised risk responses among different actors, but that the
subjectivity magniﬁes this polarisation considerably. As this subjectivity takes more complex forms it
leaves problematic residues at the end of a disease outbreak, such as an indeﬁnite drop in economic
activity and an indeﬁnite increase in anxiety.
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Introduction
Recent events such as the outbreaks in the UK of highly
pathogenic avian inﬂuenza illustrate the increasing im-
portance of managing not just the physical development of
a hazard but also the social response. The management of
hazard becomes the management of ‘issues’, where public
anxiety is regarded less as a peripheral nuisance and more
as a legitimate and consequential element of the problem
(Leiss, 2001). It therefore becomes as important to model
the public perception of risk as it does to model the
physical hazard—to understand the spread of concern as
much as the spread of a disease, for example. In many cases
the perception of risk becomes intimately combined with
the physical development of a risk, as beliefs about what is
risky behaviour come to inﬂuence levels of that behaviour
and thereby levels of exposure.
One of the main theoretical tools we have had to explain
and predict public risk perception is the social ampliﬁca-
tion of risk framework due to Kasperson et al (1988). As
we explain below, this framework claims that social processes
often combine to either exaggerate or underplay the risk
events experienced by a society. This results in unreason-
able and disproportionate reactions to risks, not only
among the lay public but also among legislators and others
responsible for managing risk. But since its inception the
idea of a ‘real’, objective process of social risk ampliﬁca-
tion has been questioned (Rayner, 1988; Rip, 1988) and,
although work in risk studies and risk management
continues to use the concept, it has remained problematic.
The question is whether, if we lose the notion of some true
risk being distorted by a social process, we lose all ability
to anticipate and explain perplexing social responses to a
risk event in a way that is informative to policymakers.
We explore this question in the context of risks
surrounding the outbreaks of zoonotic diseases—that is,
diseases that cross the species barrier to humans from other
animals. Recent cases of zoonotic disease, such as BSE,
SARS, West Nile virus and highly pathogenic avian
inﬂuenza (HPAI), have been some of the most highly
publicised and controversial risk issues encountered in recent
times. Many human diseases are zoonotic in origin but in
cases such as BSE and HPAI the disease reservoirs remain in
the animal population. This means that a public health risk
is bound up with risk to animal welfare, and often risk to the
agricultural economy, to food supply chains and to wildlife.
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and policymakers, who typically want to avoid a general
public amplifying the risk and boycotting an industry and its
products, but also want to avoid an industry underestimat-
ing a risk and failing to practice adequate biosecurity. The
BSE case in particular has been associated with ideas about
risk ampliﬁcation (eg, Eldridge and Reilly, 2003) and
continues to appear in the literature (Lewis and Tyshenko,
2009). Other zoonoses, such as chronic wasting disease in
deer herds, have also been seen as recent objects of risk
ampliﬁcation (Heberlein and Stedman, 2009).
In terms of the social reaction, not all zoonoses are alike.
Endemic zoonoses like E. coli 157 do periodically receive
public attention—for example following outbreaks at open
farms and in food supply chains. But it is the more exotic
zoonoses like BSE and HPAI that are more clearly associated
with undue anxiety and ideas about social risk ampliﬁcation.
Yet these cases also showed how uncertain the best, expertly
assessed, supposedly objective risk level can be, and this
makes it very problematic to retain the idea of an objective
process of social risk ampliﬁcation. Such cases are therefore
an important and promising setting for exploring the idea
that ampliﬁcation is only in the heads of social actors, and for
exploring the notion that this might nonetheless produce
observable, and potentially highly consequential, outcomes in
a way that risk managers need to understand.
Our study involved two main elements, the second of
which is the main subject of this article:
1. Exploratory ﬁeldwork to examine how various groups
perceived risks and risk ampliﬁcation in connection with
zoonoses like the avian inﬂuenza outbreaks in 2007;
2. A systems dynamics simulation to work out what
outcomes would emerge in a system of social actors who
attributed ampliﬁcation to other actors.
In the remainder of the paper we ﬁrst outline the
ﬁeldwork and its outcomes, and then describe the model
and simulation. Although the article concentrates on the
latter, the two parts provide complementary elements of
a process of theorising (Kopainsky and Luna-Reyes, 2008):
the ﬁeldwork, subjected to grounded analysis, produces
a small number of propositions that are built into the
systems dynamics model, and the model both operationa-
lises these propositions and explores their consequences
when operationalised in this way. The modelling is a basis
for developing theory that is relevant to policy and decision
making, rather than supporting a speciﬁc decision directly.
A discussion and conclusion follow.
Literature
Traditionally, the most problematic aspect of public risk
perception has been seen as its sometimes dramatic
divergence from expert assessments—and the way in which
this divergence has been seen as an obstacle both to
managing risks speciﬁcally and to introducing new
technology more generally. This has produced a long-
standing interest in the individual perception of risk (eg,
Slovic, 1987) and in the way that culture selects particular
risks for our attention (eg, Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).
It has led to a strong interest in risk communication (eg,
Otway and Wynne, 1989). And it has been a central theme
in the social ampliﬁcation of risk framework (or SARF)
that emerged in the late 1980s (Kasperson et al,1 9 8 8 ) .
The notion behind social risk ampliﬁcation, developed
in a series of articles (Kasperson et al, 1988; Renn, 1991;
Burns et al, 1993; Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996), is that
a risk event produces signals that are processed and
sometimes ampliﬁed by a succession of social actors
behaving as communication ‘stations’. They interact and
observe each other’s responses, sometimes producing
considerable ampliﬁcation of the original signal. A
consequence is that there are often several secondary
effects, such as product boycotts or losses of institutional
trust, that compound the effect of the orig-
inal risk event. A substantial amount of empirical work
has been conducted on or around the idea of social ampli-
ﬁcation, for example showing that the largest inﬂuence
on ampliﬁcation is typically organisational misconduct
(Freudenberg, 2003). It continues to be an important topic
in the risk literature, not least in connection with zoonosis
risks (eg, Heberlein and Stedman, 2009; Lewis and
Tyshenko, 2009).
There has always been a substantial critique of the basic
idea of social risk ampliﬁcation. Its implication that there is
some true or accurate level that becomes ampliﬁed is hard
to accept in many controversial and contested cases where
expertise is lacking or where there is no expert consensus
(Rayner, 1988). The phenomenon of ‘dueling experts’
is common in conﬂicts over environmental health, for
instance (Nelkin, 1995). More generally, the concept of risk
ampliﬁcation seems to suggest that there is a risk ‘signal’
that is outside the social system and is somehow ampliﬁed
by it (Rayner, 1988). This seems misconceived when we
take the view that ultimately risk itself is a social
construction (Hilgartner, 1992) or overlay on the world
(Jasanoff, 1993). And it naturally leads to the view that
contributors to the ampliﬁcation, such as the media (Bakir,
2005), need to be managed more effectively, and that risk
managers should concentrate on ﬁxing the mistake in the
public mind (Rip, 1988), when often it may be the expert
assessment that is mistaken.
It thus becomes hard to sustain the idea that there is a
social process by which true levels of risk get distorted.
And this appears to undermine the possibility that risk
managers can have a way of anticipating very high or
very low levels of social anxiety in any particular case.
Once risk ampliﬁcation becomes no more than a subjective
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responses, it is hard to see how risk issues can be dealt with
on an analytical basis. However, subjective beliefs about
risk can produce objective behaviours, and behaviours
can interact to produce particular outcomes. And large
discrepancies in risk beliefs between different groups
are still of considerable interest, whether or not we can
know which beliefs are going to turn out to be more
correct. In the remainder of this article we therefore
explore the consequences of the idea that social risk
ampliﬁcation is nothing more than an attribution, or
judgment that one social actor makes of another, and try
to see what implications this might have for risk managers
based on a systems dynamics model. Before this, however,
we describe the ﬁeldwork whose principal ﬁndings were




The aim of the ﬁeldwork was to explore how social actors
reason about the risks of recent zoonotic disease outbreaks,
and in particular how they make judgments of other actors
systematically amplifying or attenuating such risks. This
involved a grounded, qualitative study of what a number
of groups said in the course of a number of unstructured
interviews and focus groups. It follows the general principle
of using qualitative empirical work as a basis for systems
dynamics modelling (Luna-Reyes and Andersen, 2003).
Focus groups were used where possible, for both lay and
professional or expert actors; individual interviews were
used where access could only be gained to relevant groups
(such as journalists) as individuals. The participants were
selected from a range of groups having a stake in zoonotic
outbreaks such as avian inﬂuenza incidents and are listed
in Table 1.
The focus groups followed a topic guide that was
initially used in a pilot focus group and continually reﬁned
throughout the programme. They started with a short
brieﬁng on the speciﬁc topic of zoonotic diseases, with
recent, well-publicised examples. The professional and
expert groups were also asked to explain their roles in
relation to the management of zoonotic diseases. Partici-
pants were then invited to consider recent cases and other
examples they knew of, discuss their reactions to the risks
they presented, and discuss the way the risks had been, or
were being, managed. Their discussions were recorded and
the recordings transcribed except in two cases where it was
only feasible to record researcher notes. The individual
interviews followed the same format.
Analysis of the transcripts followed a typical process of
grounded theorising (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), in which
the aim was to ﬁnd a way of categorising participants’
responses that gave some theoretical insight into the
principle of risk ampliﬁcation as a subjective attribution.
The categories were arrived at in a process of ‘constant
comparison’ of the data and emerging, tentative categories
until all responses have been satisfactorily categorised in
relation to each other (Glaser, 2002). In Glaser’s words,
‘Validity is achieved, after much ﬁtting of words, when the
chosen one best represents the pattern. It is as valid as it is
grounded’. Our approach also drew on template analysis
(King, 1998) in that we started with the basic categories of
attributing risk ampliﬁcation and risk attenuation, not
a blank sheet. A fuller account of the analysis process
and ﬁndings is given in a parallel publication (Busby and
Duckett, 2012).
Findings
The ﬁrst main theme to emerge from the data was the way
in which actors privilege their own views, and construct
reasons to hold on to them by ﬁnding explanations for
other views as being systematically exaggerated or under-
played. It is surprising in a sense that this was relatively
symmetrical. We expected expert groups to characterise lay
groups as exaggerating or underplaying risk, but we also
expected lay groups to use authoritative risk statements
from expert groups and organisations of various kinds
as ways of correcting their own initial and tentative beliefs.
But there was no evidence for this kind of corrective
process.
The reasons that informants gave for why other actors
systematically amplify or attenuate risk were categorised
under ﬁve main headings: cognition, or the way they
formed their beliefs; disposition, or their inherent natures;
situation, or the particular circumstances; strategy,
or deliberate, instrumental action; and structure, or basic
Table 1 Data collection
Method Informant(s) Number
Focus groups Academic researchers (pilot) 3
Graduate students in management
or social science
5
Mothers of young children 7
Retired people 5
Livestock farmers (1) 8
Livestock farmers (2) 12
Veterinarians on PhD programme 5
Agricultural ofﬁcials (1) 6
Agricultural ofﬁcials (2) 5
Food safety ofﬁcials 4
Individual
interviews
Virologists and microbiologists 3
Public health, union and NGO
ofﬁcials
7
Journalists and broadcasters 3
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group saw the highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI)
outbreak at Holton in the UK in 2007 as presenting
a serious risk and explained the ofﬁcial advice that it
presented only a very small risk as arising from a con-
spiracy between industry and government that the disposi-
tions of the two naturally created.
This second main theme was that some groups of
informants often lacked speciﬁc and direct knowledge
about relevant risks, and resorted to reasoning about other
actors’ responses to those risks. This reasoning involved
moderating those observations with beliefs about whether
other actors are inclined to amplify or attenuate risk. Lay
groups received information through the media but they
had deﬁnite, and somewhat cliche ´ d, beliefs about the
accuracy of risk portrayals in the media, for example. Thus
some informants saw the media treatment of HPAI
outbreaks as risk amplifying and portrayed the media
as having an incentive to sensationalise coverage, but
others (particularly virologists) saw media coverage as risk
attenuating out of scientiﬁc ignorance.
A third theme was that risk perceptions often came from
the speciﬁc associations that arose in particular cases. For
example, the Holton HPAI outbreak involved a large food
processing ﬁrm that had earlier been involved in dietary
and nutritional controversies. The ﬁrm employed intensive
poultry rearing practices and was also importing partial
products from a processor abroad. This particular case
therefore bound together issues of intensive rearing, global
sourcing, zoonotic outbreaks and lifestyle risks—incidental
associations that enabled some informants to perceive high
levels of risk and indignation, and portray others as
attenuating this risk.
The fourth theme was that some actors have speciﬁc
reasons to overcome what they see as other actors’
ampliﬁcations or attenuations. They do not just discount
another actor’s distortions but seek to change them. For
example, staff in one government agency believed they had
to correct farmers who were underplaying risk and not
practicing sufﬁcient bio-security, and also correct con-
sumers who were exaggerating risk and boycotting
important agricultural products. Such actors do not simply
observe other actors’ expressed risk levels but try to
communicate in such a way as to inﬂuence these expressed
levels—for example through awareness-raising campaigns.
The ﬁeldwork therefore pointed to a model in which
actors like members of the public based their risk
evaluations on what they were told by others, corrected
in some way for what they expected to be others’
ampliﬁcations or attenuations; discrepancies between their
current evaluations and those of others would be regarded
as evidence of such ampliﬁcations, rather than being
used to correct their own evaluations. The ﬁndings also
indicated a model in which risk managers would commu-
nicate risk levels in a way that was intended to overcome
the misconceptions of actors like the public. These are the
underpinning elements of the models we describe below.
Systems dynamics was a natural choice for this
modelling on several grounds. First, there is an inherent
stress on endogeneity in the basic idea of social risk
ampliﬁcation, and in particular in the notion that it is an
attribution. Risk responses ﬁrst and foremost reﬂect the
way people think about risks and think about the responses
of other people to those risks. Second, the explicit and
intuitive representation of feedback loops was important
to show the reﬂective nature of social behaviour: how
actors see the impact of their risk responses on other actors
and modify their responses accordingly. Third, memory
plays an important part in this, since the idea that some
actor is a risk ampliﬁer will be based on remembering their
past responses, and the accumulative capacity of stocks
in systems dynamics provides an obvious way of represent-
ing social memory. Developing a systems dynamics model
on the grounded theory therefore followed naturally, and
helped to add a deductive capability to the essentially
inductive process of grounded theory (Kopainsky and
Luna-Reyes, 2008). Kopainsky and Luna-Reyes (2008)
also point out that grounded theory can produce large and
rich sets of evidence and overly complex theory, making it
important to have a rigorous approach to concentrating
on small numbers of variables and relationships. Thus, in
the modelling we describe in the next section, the aim
w a st ot r yt or e p r e s e n tr i s ka m p l i ﬁ c a t i o nw i t ha sl i t t l e
elaboration as possible, so that it would be clear what the
consequences of the basic structural commitments might be.
This meant reduction to the simplest possible system of two
actors, interacting repeatedly over time during the period of
an otherwise static risk event (such as a zoonosis outbreak).
Modelling
Background
Applications of systems dynamics have been wide-ranging,
addressing issues in domains ranging from business
(Morecroft and van der Heijden, 1992) to military (Minami
and Madnick, 2009), from epidemiology (Dangerﬁeld et al,
2001) to diffusion models in marketing (Morecroft, 1984),
from modelling physical state such as demography
(Meadows et al, 2004) to mental state such as trust
(Luna-Reyes et al, 2008; Martinez-Moyano and Samsa,
2008). Applications to issues of risk, particularly risk
perception, are much more limited. There has been some
application of system dynamics to the diffusion of fear and
SARF, speciﬁcally (Burns and Slovic, 2007; Sundrani,
2007), but not to the idea of social ampliﬁcation as an
attribution.
Probably the closest examples to our work in the system
dynamics literature deal with trust. Luna-Reyes et al
(2008), for example, applied system dynamics to investigate
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projects. To make modelling tractable, the authors make
several simplifying assumptions including the aggregation
of various government agencies as a single actor and
various service providers as another actor. Each actor
accumulates the knowledge of the other actor’s work, and
the authors explore the dynamics that emerge from their
interaction. Greer et al (2006) modelled similar interac-
tions—this time between client and contractor—each
having its own, accumulated understandings of a common
or global quantity (in this case the ‘baseline’ of work
a project). Martinez-Moyano and Samsa (2008) developed
a system dynamics model to support a feedback theory of
trust and conﬁdence. This represented the mutual interac-
tion between two actors (government and public) in a
social system where each actor assesses the trustworthiness
of the other actor over time, with both actors maintaining
memories of the actions and outcomes of the other actor.
Our approach draws from all these studies, modelling
a system in which actors interact on the basis of
remembered, past interactions as they make assessments
of some common object. The actors are in fact groups of
individuals who are presumed to be acting in some
concerted way. Although this may seem questionable there
are several justiﬁcations for doing so: (1) the aim is not to
represent the diversity of the social world but to explore
the consequences of speciﬁc ideas about phenomena like
social risk ampliﬁcation; (2) in some circumstances a ‘risk
manager’ such as a private corporation or a government
agency may act very much like a unit actor, especially when
it is trying to coordinate its communications in the course
of risk events; (3) equally in some circumstances it may be
quite realistic to see a ‘public’ as acting in a relatively
consensual way whose net, aggregate or average response is
of more interest than the variance of response.
In the following sections we develop a model in three
stages. In the ﬁrst, we represent the conventional view
of social risk ampliﬁcation; in the second, we add our
subjective, attributional approach in a basic form; and in
the third we make the attributional elements more
realistically complex. The aim is to explore the implications
of the principal ﬁndings of the ﬁeldwork, and our basic
theoretical commitments to social risk ampliﬁcation as an
attribution, with as little further adornment as possible,
while also incorporating elements shown in the literature to
be important aspects of risk ampliﬁcation.
First model: basic elements from the traditional view
In the ﬁrst model, shown in Figure 1, we represent in a
simple way the basic notion of social risk ampliﬁcation.
The fundamental idea is that risk responses are socially
developed, not simply the sum of the isolated reactions of
unconnected individuals. The model represents a popula-
tion as being in one of two states of worry. This is simpler
than the three-state model of Burns and Slovic (2007) but it
is unclear what an intermediate state like being ‘concerned’
particularly adds to the model. There is also no need for
a recovering or removal state, as in SIR (Susceptible
Infectious Recovered) models (Sterman, 2004, p 303), since
there is no concept of immunity and it seems certain that
people can be worried by the same thing all over again.
The ﬂow from an Unworried state to a Worried state is a
function of how far the proportion in the Worried state
exceeds that normally expected in regard to a risk event
such as a zoonotic disease outbreak. Members of the public
expect some of their number to become anxious in
connection with any risk issue: when, through commu-
nication or observation, they realise this number exceeds
expectation, this in itself becomes a reason for others to
become anxious. This observation of fellow citizens is not
medium-speciﬁc, so it is a combination of observation by
word-of-mouth, social networks and broadcast media. In
terms of how this inﬂuences perception, various processes
are suggested in the literature. For example, there is
a variety of ‘social contagion’ effects (Levy and Nail, 1993;
Scherer and Cho, 2003) relevant to such situations. Social
learning (Bandura, 1977) or ‘learning by proxy’ (Gardner
et al, 2000) may also well be important. We do not model
speciﬁc mechanisms but only an aggregate process by
which the observation of worry inﬂuences the ﬂow into
a state of being worried.
The ﬂow out of the Worried state is a natural relaxation
process. It is hard to stay worried about a speciﬁc issue for
any length of time, and the atrophy of vigilance is reported
in the literature (Freudenberg, 2003). There is also a base
ﬂow between the states, reﬂecting the way in which—in the
context of any public risk event—there will be some small
proportion of the population that becomes worried,
irrespective of peers and public information. This base
ﬂow also has the function of dealing with the ‘startup
problem’ in which zero ﬂow is a potential equilibrium for
the model (Sterman, 2004, p 322).
The public risk perception in this model stands in
relation to an expert, supposedly authoritative assessment
of the risk. People worry when seeing others worry, but
moderate this response when exposed to exogenous
information—the expert or managerial risk assessment.
What ultimately regulates worry is some combination of
these two elements and it is this regulatory variable that we
call a resultant ‘risk perception’. Unlike Burns and Slovic
(2007) we do not represent this as a stock because it is not
anyone’s belief, and so need not have inertia. The fact that
various members of the public are in different states of
worry means that there is no belief that all share, as such.
Instead, risk perception is an emergent construct on which
ﬂows between unworried and worried states depend (and
which also determines how demand for risky goods
changes, as we explain below). In the simplest model we
simply take this resultant risk perception as a weighted
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population worried and the publically known expert risk
assessment.
The expert assessment grows from zero toward a ﬁnite
level, for a certain period, before decaying again to zero.
This reﬂects a time proﬁle for typical risk events—for
example zoonotic outbreaks such as SARS—where num-
bers of reported cases climb progressively and rapidly to a
peak before declining (eg, Leung et al, 2004). The units for
risk perception and the expert assessment are arbitrary, but
for exposition are taken as probabilities of individual
fatality during a speciﬁc risk event. Numerical values of the
exogenous risk-related variables are based on an outbreak
in which the highest fatality probability is 10
 3. But risks in
a modern society tend to vary over several orders of
magnitude. Typically, individual fatality probabilities of
10
 6 are regarded as ‘a very low level of risk’, whereas risks
of 10
 3 are seen as very high and at the limit of tolerability
for risks at work (HSE, 2001). Because both assessed and
perceived risks are likely to vary widely, discrepancies
between risk levels are represented as ratios.
The way in which the expert assessment is commu-
nicated to the public is via some homogenous channel we
have simply referred to as the ‘media’. In our basic model
we represent in very crude terms the way in which this
media might exaggerate the difference between expert
assessment and public perception. But the SARF literature
suggests there is no consistent relationship between media
coverage and either levels of public concern or frequencies
of fatalities (Breakwell and Barnett, 2003; Finkel, 2008), so
the extent of this exaggeration is likely to be highly case
speciﬁc. It is also possible that the media have an effect on
responses by exaggerating to a given actor its own
responses. The public, for example, could have an inﬂated
idea of how worried they are because newspapers or blogs
portray it to be so. But we do not represent this because it
is so speculative and may be indeterminable empirically.
Finally, the base model also represents the way in which
risk perception inﬂuences behaviour, in particular the
consumption of the goods or services that expose people to
the risk in question. The 2005 Holton UK outbreak of
HPAI, for example, occurred at a turkey meat processing
plant and affected demand for its products; the SARS
outbreak affected demand for travel, particularly aviation
services. Brahmbhatt and Dutta (2008) even refer to the
economic disruption caused by ‘panicky’ public responses
Figure 1 Base model of social ampliﬁcation of risk.
6 Journal of the Operational Research Societyas ‘SARS type’ effects. There are many complications here,
not least that reducing consumption of one amenity as a
result of heightened risk perception may increase con-
sumption of a riskier amenity. Air travel in the US fell after
9/11 but travel by car increased and aggregate risk levels
were said to have risen in consequence (Gigerenzer, 2006).
A further complication is that in certain situations, such as
bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), risk perceptions
are directly self-fulﬁlling rather than self-correcting. The
most common effect is probably that heightened risk
perceptions will lead to reduced demand for the amenity
that causes exposure, leading to reductions in exposure and
reductions in the expert risk assessment, but it is worth
noting that the effect is case-speciﬁc. The expert risk
assessment is therefore not exogenous, and there is a
negative feedback loop that operates to counteract rising
risk perceptions.
Second model: adding an attributional subsystem
As we show later from the simulation outcomes, the base
model shows a public risk perception that can be con-
siderably larger than the expert risk assessment. It therefore
seems to show ‘risk ampliﬁcation’. But there is no variable
that stands for risk in the model: there are only beliefs
about risk (called either assessments or perceptions). The
idea that social risk ampliﬁcation is a subjective attribu-
tion, not an objective phenomenon, means that this
divergence of risk perception and expert assessment does
not amount to risk ampliﬁcation. And it says that actors
see others as being risk ampliﬁers, or attenuators, and
develop their responses accordingly. This means that we
need to add to SARF, and the basic model of the previous
section, the processes by which actors observe, diagnose
and deal with other actors’ risk assessments or perceptions.
What our ﬁeldwork revealed was that the social system did
not correct ‘mistaken’ risk perceptions in some simple-
minded fashion. In other words, it was not the case that
people formed risk perceptions, received information about
expert assessment, and then corrected their perceptions in
the correct direction. Instead, as we explained earlier, they
found reasons why expert assessments, and in fact the risk
views of any other group, might be subject to systematic
ampliﬁcation or attenuation. They then corrected for that
ampliﬁcation. Risk managers, on the other hand, had the
task of overcoming what they saw as mistaken risk
responses in other groups, not simply correcting for them.
Therefore in the second model, shown in Figure 2, we
now have a subsystem in which a risk manager (a gov-
ernment agency or an industrial undertaking in the case of
zoonotic disease outbreaks) observes the public risk per-
ception in relation to the expert risk assessment, and com-
municates a risk level that is designed to compensate for
any discrepancy between the two. Commercial risk man-
agers will naturally want to counteract risk ampliﬁcation
that leads to revenue losses from product and service
boycotts, and governmental risk managers will want to
counteract the risk ampliﬁcation that produces panic and
disorder. As Beck et al (2005) report, the UK BSE inquiry
found that risk managers’ approach to communicating risk
‘was shaped by a consuming fear of provoking an irrational
public scare’. The effect is symmetrical to the extent that the
public in turn observes discrepancies between managerial
communications and its own risk perceptions, and attributes
ampliﬁcation or attenuation accordingly.
Attributions are based on simple memory of past
observations. This historical memory of another actor’s
apparent distortions is sometimes mentioned in the SARF
literature (Kasperson et al, 1988; Poumadere and Mays,
2003). This memory is represented as stocks of observed
discrepancies, reaching a level Mi(t)for actor i at time t.









Mi(t)40 implies that actor i sees the other actor as
exaggerating risk, while Mi(t)o0 implies perceived
attenuation. The speciﬁc deposits in an actor’s memory
are not retrievable, and equal weight is given to every
observation that contributes to it. The perceived scale of
ampliﬁcation is the time average of memory content,
and the conﬁdence the actor has in this perceived
ampliﬁcation is 1 e
 |M(t)| where conﬁdence grows loga-
rithmically towards unity as the magnitude of the memory
increases. The managerial actor modiﬁes the risk level
it communicates by the perceived scale of public ampliﬁca-
tion raised to the power of its conﬁdence, while the public
adjusts the communicated risk level it takes account of by
the perceived scale of managerial attenuation raised to the
power of its conﬁdence in this.
Third model: adding complexity to the model
In the third model, in Figure 3, we add three elements
found in the risk ampliﬁcation literature that become
especially relevant to the idea of risk ampliﬁcation as
a subjective attribution: confusion, distrust and differ-
ing perceptions about the signiﬁcance of behavioural
change. The confusion issue reﬂects the way an otherwise
authoritative actor’s view tends to be discounted if it shows
evidence of confusion, uncertainty or inexplicable change.
Two articles in the recent literature on zoonosis risk
(Bergeron and Sanchez, 2005; Heberlein and Stedman,
2009) speciﬁcally describe the risk amplifying effect of the
authorities seeming confused or uncertain. The distrust
issue reﬂects the observation that ‘distrust acts to heighten
r is k p er ce pt io n...’ ( Ka s pe r s on et al, 2003), and that it
is ‘associated with perceptions of deliberate distortion of
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in the past’ (Frewer, 2003, p 126). A distinguishing aspect
of trust and distrust is the basic asymmetry such that trust
is quick to be lost and slow to be gained (Slovic, 1993).
In Figure 3, the confusion function is based on the rate
of change of attributed ampliﬁcation, not rate of change
communication itself, since some change in communication
might appear justiﬁed if correlated with a change in public
perception: G ¼ 1   e
 gC gðtÞ jj ; where Cg (t) is the change in
managerial ampliﬁcation in unit time. The distrust function
is based on the extent of remembered attributed ampliﬁca-
tion: F ¼ 1   e
 fM gðtÞ jj ; where Mg(t) is the memory of
managerial risk ampliﬁcation at time t and f is the distrust
parameter. There is no obvious ﬁnding in the literature that
would help us set the value of such a parameter. The
combination of the confusion and distrust factors is a
combination of an integrator and a differentiator. It is used
to determine how much weight is given to managerial risk
communications in the formation of the resultant risk
perception. It is deﬁned such that as distrust and confu-
sion both approach unity, this weight w tends to zero:
w¼wmax(1 G)(1 F). This weight was exogenous in the
previous model, so the effect of introducing confusion and
distrust is also to endogenise the way observation of worry
is combined with authoritative risk communication.
The third addition in this model is an important
disproportionality effect. The previous models assume that
risk managers base their view of the public risk perception
on some kind of direct observation—for example, through
clamour, media activity, surveys and so on. In practice, the
managerial view is at least partly based on the public’s
consumption of the amenity that is risk, for example the
consumption of beef during the BSE crisis, or ﬂight
bookings and hotel reservations during the SARS out-
break. The problem is that when a foodstuff like beef
becomes a risk object it may be easy for many people
to stop consuming it, and such a response from the
consumer’s perspective can be proportionate to even a mild
risk assessment. Reducing beef consumption is an easy
precaution for most of the population to take (Frewer,
2003), so rational even when there is little empirical
evidence that there is a risk at all (Rip, 2006). Yet this easy
response of boycotting beef may be disastrous for the beef
industry, and therefore seem highly disproportionate to the
industry, to related industries and to government agencies
supporting the industry.
Figure 2 Model of the attributional view of risk ampliﬁcation.
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fying this effect in general terms. Recent work (Mehers,
2011) looking at the effect of heightened risk perceptions
around the avian inﬂuenza outbreak at a meat processing
plant suggests that the inﬂuence on the demand for the
associated meat products was very mixed. Different regions
and different demographic groups showed quite different
reactions, for example, and the effect was confounded
by actions (particularly price changes) taken by manu-
facturer and retailers. Our approach is to represent the
disproportionality effect with a single exogenous factor—
the relative substitutability of the amenity for similar
amenities on the supply and demand side. The risk
manager interprets any change in public demand for the
amenity multiplied by this factor as being the change in
public risk perception. If the change in this inferred public
risk perception exceeds that observed directly (for example
by opinion survey), then it becomes the determinant of
how risk managers think the public are viewing the risk in
question. This relative substitutability is entirely a function
of the speciﬁc industry (and so risk manager) in question:
there is no ‘societal’ value for such a parameter, and the
effects of a given risk perception on amenity demand will
always be case speciﬁc. For example, Brahmbhatt and
Dutta (2008) reported that the SARS outbreak led to
revenue losses in Beijing of 80% in tourist attractions,
exhibitions and hotels, but of 10-50% in travel agencies,
airlines, railways and so on. The effects are substantial but
a long way from being constant.
Behaviour
In this section we brieﬂy present the outcomes of
simulation with two aims: ﬁrst to show how the successive
models produce differences in behaviour, if at all, and
thereby to assess how much value there is in the models for
policymakers; second to assess how much uncertainty in
Figure 3 Model of a more complex attributional view of risk ampliﬁcation.
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uncertainty in the exogenous parameters.
Model behaviour
Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the three successive
models in terms of public risk perception and expert risk
assessment. For the three models, the exogenous variables
are set at their modal values and when variables are shared
between models they have the same values. The expert risk
assessment is thus very similar for each model, as shown in
the ﬁgure, rising towards its target level, falling as public
risk perception reduces exposure, and then ceasing as the
crisis ends around Day 40. In the base model, the public
risk perception is eight times higher than the expert
assessment at its peak, which occurs some 20 days after
that in the expert assessment. But once the attributional
view of risk ampliﬁcation is modelled, this disparity
becomes much greater, and it occurs earlier. In the simple
attributional system the peak discrepancy is over 40 times,
and in the complex attributional system nearly 400 times,
both occurring within 8 days of the expert assessment peak.
Thus the effect of seeing risk ampliﬁcation as the subjective
judgment of one actor about another is, given the
assumptions in our models, to polarise risk beliefs much
more strongly and somewhat more rapidly. We can no
longer call the outcome a ‘risk ampliﬁcation’ since, by
assumption, there is no longer an objective risk level
exogenous to the social system. But there is evidently
strong polarisation.
There is some qualitative difference in the time proﬁle of
risk perception between the three models, as shown in the
previous ﬁgure where the peak risk perception occurs
earlier in the later models. There are also important
qualitative differences in the time proﬁles of stock variables
amenity demand and worried population, as shown in
Figure 5. When the attributional view is taken, both
demand and worry take longer to recover to initial levels,
and when the more complex attributional elements are
modelled (the effects of mistrust, confusion and different
perceptions of the meaning of changes in demand),
the model indicates that little recovery takes place at all.
The scale of the recovery depends on the value of the
exogenous parameters, and some of these (as we discuss
below) are case speciﬁc. But of primary importance is the
way the weighting given to managerial communications or
expert assessment is dragged down by public attributions.
This result indicates the importance of a complex,
attributional view of risk ampliﬁcation. Unlike the base
model, in the attributional model it is much more likely
there will be an indeﬁnite residue from a crisis—even when
the expert assessment of risk falls to near zero.
Figures 6 and 7 show the time development of risk
perception in the third model in terms of the mean
outcome with (a) 95% conﬁdence intervals on the mean
and (b) tolerance intervals for 95% conﬁdence in 90%
coverage over 1000 runs, with triangular distributions
assigned to the exogenous parameters and plausible ranges
based solely on the author’s subjective estimates. The
exogenous parameters fall into two main groups. The ﬁrst
group is of case-speciﬁc factors and would be expected to
vary between risk events. This includes, for example, the
relative substitutability of the amenity that is the carrier of
the risk, and the latency before changes in demand for this
amenity change the level of risk exposure. The remaining
parameters are better seen as social constants, since there is
no theoretical reason to think that they will vary from one
risk event to another. These include factors like the natural
vigilance period among the population, the normal ﬂow of
people into a state of worry, the latency before people
become aware of a discrepancy between emergent risk
perception and the proportion of the population that is in a
state of worry. Figure 6 shows the conﬁdence and tolerance
intervals with the social constants varying within their
plausible ranges and the case-speciﬁc factors ﬁxed at their
modal values, and Figure 7 vice versa. Thus Figure 6 shows
the effect of our uncertainty about the character of society,
Figure 4 Outcomes of the three models.
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would expect among risk events. The substantial difference
between the means in risk perception between the two
ﬁgures reﬂects large differences between means and modes
in the distributions attributed to the parameters, which
arises because plausible ranges sometimes cover multiple
orders of magnitude (eg, the confusion and distrust
constants both range from 1 to 100 with modes of 10,
and the memory constant from 10 to 1000 with a mode of
100). These ﬁgures do not give a complete understanding,
not least because interactions between the two sets of
parameters are possible, but they show a reasonably robust
qualitative proﬁle.
Figure 8 shows the ‘simple’ correlation coefﬁcients
between resultant risk perception and the policy-relevant
exogenous parameters over time, as recommended by Ford
and Flynn (2005) as an indication of the relative importance
of model inputs. At each day of the simulation, the sample
correlation coefﬁcient is calculated for each parameter over
the 1000 runs. No attempt has been made to inspect
whether the most important inputs are correlated, and to
reﬁne the model in the light of this. Nonetheless the ﬁgure
gives some indication of how inﬂuential are the most
Figure 5 Further outcomes of the three models.
Figure 6 Conﬁdence intervals on the time development of risk
perception in the third model, case-speciﬁc factors ﬁxed.
Figure 7 Conﬁdence intervals on the time development of risk
perception in the third model, social constants ﬁxed.
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(ie, the original scale of the risk according to expert
assessment), the expert assessment adjustment time (ie, the
delay in the ofﬁcial estimate reﬂecting the latest informa-
tion), the base ﬂow (the ﬂow of people between states of
non-worry and worry in relation to a risk irrespective of the
speciﬁc social inﬂuences being modelled) and the normal
risk perception (the baseline against which the resultant risk
perception is gauged, reﬂecting a level of risk that would be
unsurprising and lead to no increase in the numbers of the
worried). The ﬁrst of these is case-speciﬁc, but the other
three would evidently be worth empirical investigation given
their inﬂuence in the model.
Empirical comparisons
It is extremely difﬁcult to test such outcomes against
empirical data because cases differ so widely and it is
unusual to ﬁnd data on simultaneous expert assessments
and public perceptions over short-run risk events like
disease outbreaks, particularly outbreaks of zoonotic
disease. But a World Bank paper of 2008, on the economic
effects of infectious disease outbreaks (primarily SARS,
a zoonotic disease), collected together data gathered on
the 2003 SARS outbreak, and some—primarily that of Lau
et al (2003)—showed the day-by-day development of risk
perception alongside reported cases. Figure 9 is based on
Lau et al’s data (2003), and shows the number of reported
cases of SARS as a proportion of the Hong Kong
population at the time, together with the percentage of
people in a survey expressing a perception that they had a
large or very large chance of infection from SARS. The two
lines can be regarded as reasonably good proxies for the
risk perception and expert assessment outcomes in Figure 4
and they show a rough correspondence: a growth in both
perception and expertly assessed or measured ‘reality’,
followed by a decay, in which the perception appears
strongly exaggerated from the standpoint of the expert
assessment. The perceptual gap is about four orders of
magnitude—greater than even the more complex attribu-
tional system in our modelling. Moreover, the risk
perception peak occurs early, and in fact leads the reported
cases peak. It is our models 2 and especially 3 in which the
perception peak occurs early (although it never leads the
expert assessment peak).
Discussion
The implications of the work
The social ampliﬁcation of risk framework has always been
presented as an ‘integrative framework’ (Kasperson et al,
1988), rather than a speciﬁc theory, so there has always
been a need for more speciﬁc modelling to make its basic
concepts precise enough to be properly explored. At the
same time, as suggested earlier, its implication that there
is some true level of risk that becomes distorted in social
Figure 8 Correlations between exogenous parameters and
resultant risk perception over time.
Figure 9 Values from Lau et al (2003) survey of perceived
infection risk.
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set out to explore whether it is possible to retain some
concept of social risk ampliﬁcation in cases where even
expert opinion tends to be divided, the science is often
very incomplete, and past expert assessment has been
discredited. Zoonotic disease outbreaks provide a context
in which such conditions appear to hold.
Our ﬁeldwork broadly pointed to a social system in
which social actors of all kinds privilege their own risk
views, in which they nonetheless have to rely on other
actor’s responses in the absence of direct knowledge or
experience of the risks in question, in which they attribute
risk ampliﬁcation or attenuation to other actors, and in
which they have reasons to correct for or overcome this
ampliﬁcation. To explore how we can model such pro-
cesses has been the main purpose of the work we have
described. And the resulting model provides speciﬁc
indications of what policymakers need to deal with—a
much greater polarisation of risk beliefs, and potentially
a residue of worry and loss of demand after the end
of a risk crisis. It also has the important implication
that risk managers’ perspectives should shift, from
correcting a public’s mistakes about risk to thinking
about how their own responses and communications
contribute to the public’s views about a risk. Our
approach helps to endogenise the risk perception
problem, recognising that it is not simply a ﬂaw in the
world ‘out there’. It is thus an important step in
becoming a more sophisticated risk manager or man-
ager of risk issues (Leiss, 2001).
It is instructive to compare this model with models like
that of Luna-Reyes et al (2008) which essentially involve
a convergent process arise from knowledge sharing, and
the subsequent development of trust. We demonstrate a
process in which there is knowledge sharing, but a sharing
that is undermined by expectations of social risk ampliﬁca-
tion. Observing discrepancies in risk beliefs leads not to
correction and consensus but to self-conﬁrmation and
polarisation. Our ﬁndings in some respects are similar to
Greer et al (2006), who were concerned with discrepancies
in the perceptions of workload in the eyes of two actors
involved in a common project. Such discrepancies arose
not from exogenous causes but from unclear communica-
tion and delay inherent in the social system. All this
reinforces the long-held view in the risk community, and of
risk communication researchers in particular, that authen-
tic risk communication should involve sustained rela-
tionships, and the open recognition of uncertainties and
difﬁculties that would normally be regarded as threats to
credibility (Otway and Wynne, 1989). The reason is not
just the moral requirement to avoid the perpetuation of
powerful actors’ views, and not just the efﬁciency require-
ment to maximise the knowledge base that contributes to
managing a risk issue. The reason is also that the structure
of interactions can be unstable, producing a polarisation
of view that none of the actors intended. Actors engaged
with each other can realise this and overcome it.
Limitations of the modelling
A basic limitation to the use of the models to support
speciﬁc risk management decisions, rather than give more
general insight into social phenomena, is that there are very
few sources of plausible data for some important variables
in the model, such as the relaxation delay deﬁning how
long people tend to stay worried about a speciﬁc risk event
before fatigue, boredom or replacement by worry about a
new crisis leads them to stop worrying. It is particularly
difﬁcult to see where values of the case-speciﬁc parameters
are going to come from. Other SD work on risk
ampliﬁcation at least partly avoids the calibration problem
by using unit-less normalised scales and subjective judg-
ments (Burns and Slovic, 2007). And one of the beneﬁts of
this exploratory modelling is to suggest that such variables
are worthwhile subjects for empirical research. But at
present the modelling does not support prediction and does
not help determine best courses of action at particular
points in particular crises.
In terms of its more structural limitations, the model is
a small one that concentrates speciﬁcally on the risk
ampliﬁcation phenomenon to the exclusion of the many
other processes that, in any real situation, risk ampliﬁca-
tion is connected with. As such, it barely forms a
‘microworld’ (Morecroft, 1988). It contrasts with related
work such as that of Martinez-Moyano and Samsa’s (2008)
modelling of trust in government, which similarly analyses
a continuing interaction between two aggregate actors
but draws extensively on cognitive science. However,
incorporating a lot more empirical science does not avoid
having to make many assumptions and selections that
potentially stand in the way of seeing through to how a
system produces its outcomes. The more elaborate the
model the more there is to dispute and undermine the
starkness of an interesting phenomenon. We have had to
make few assumptions about the world, about psychology
and about sociology before concluding that social risk
ampliﬁcation as little more than a subjective attribution
has a strongly destabilising potential. This parsimony
reﬂects Towill’s (1993) notion that we start the modelling
process by looking for the boundary that ‘encompasses the
smallest number of components within which the dynamic
behaviour under study is generated’. The model attempts
to introduce nothing that is unnecessary to working out
the consequences of risk ampliﬁcation as an attribution.
As Ghaffarzadegan et al (2011) point out in their paper
on small models applied to problems of public policy, and
echoing Forrester’s (2007) argument for ‘powerful small
models’, the point is to gain accessibility and insight.
Having only ‘a few signiﬁcant stocks and at most seven or
eight major feedback loops’, small models can convey the
JS Busby and S Onggo—Managing amplification of risk 13counterintuitive endogenous complexity of situations in
a way that policymakers can still follow. They are small
enough to show systems in aggregate, to stress the
endogeneity of inﬂuences on the system’s behaviour, and
to clearly illustrate how policy resistance comes about
(Ghaffarzadegan et al, 2011). As a result they are more
promising as tools for developing correct intuitions, and
for helping actors who may be trapped in a systemic
interaction to overcome this and reach a certain degree of
self-awareness (Lane, 1999).
Conclusion
The intended contribution of this study has been to show
how to model a long-established, qualitative framework
for reasoning about risk perception and risk communica-
tion, and in the process deal with one of the main criticisms
of this framework. The idea that in a society the perception
of a risk becomes exaggerated to the point where it bears
no relation to our best expert assessments of the risk is an
attractive one for policymakers having to deal with what
seem to be grossly inﬂated or grossly under-played public
reactions to major events. But this idea has always been
vulnerable to the criticism that we cannot know objectively
if a risk is being exaggerated, and that expert assessments
are as much a product of social processes as lay opinion.
The question we posed at the start of the paper was
whether, in dropping a commitment to the idea of an
objective risk ampliﬁcation, there is anything left to model
and anything left to say to policymakers. Our work
suggests that there is, and that modelling risk ampliﬁcation
as something that one social actor thinks another is doing
is a useful thing to do. There were some simple policy
implications emerging from this modelling. For example,
once you accept that there is no objective standard to
indicate when risk ampliﬁcation is occurring, actors are
likely to correct for other actors’ apparent risk ampliﬁca-
tions and attenuation, instead of simple-mindedly correct-
ing their own risk beliefs. This can have a strongly
polarising effect on risk beliefs, and can produce residual
worry and loss of demand for associated products and
services after a crisis has passed. The limitations of the
work point to further developments in several directions.
First, there is a need to explore various aspects of how risk
managers experience risk ampliﬁcation. For example, the
modelling, as it stands, concentrates on the interactions of
actors in the context of a single event or issue—such as
a speciﬁc zoonotic outbreak. In reality, actors generally
have a long history of interaction around earlier events. We
take account of history within an event, but not between
events. A future step should therefore be to expand the
timescale, moving from intra-event interaction to inter-
event interaction. The superposition of a longer term
process is likely to produce a model in which processes
acting over different timescales interact and cannot simply
be treated additively (Forrester, 1987). It also introduces
the strong possibility of discontinuities, particularly when
modelling organisational or institutional actors like gov-
ernments whose doctrines can change radically following
elections—rather like the discontinuities that have to be
modelled to represent personnel changes and consequences
like scapegoating (Howick and Eden, 2004).
Another important direction of work would be a
modelling of politics and power. It is a common
observation in risk controversies that risk is a highly
political construction—being used by different groups to
gain resources and inﬂuence. As Powell and Coyle (2005)
point out, the systems dynamics literature makes little
reference to power, raising questions about the appropri-
ateness of our modelling approach to a risk ampliﬁca-
tion subject—both in its lack of power as an object for
modelling, and its inattention to issues of power surround-
ing the use of the model and its apparent implications.
Powell and Coyle’s (2005) politicised inﬂuence diagrams
might provide a useful medium for representing issues of
power, both within the model of risk ampliﬁcation and in
the understanding of the system in which the model might
be inﬂuential. The notion, as currently expressed in our
modelling, that it is always in one actor’s interest to
somehow correct another’s ampliﬁcation simply looks
naı¨ve.
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